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A Braunfeld v. Brown Test for Indirect
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion
Where government abridge8 an individual's free exercise
of religion, the courts must determine either, if the burden
on the rel gious practice is indirect, how to accommodate
the competing interests or, if the burden is direct, which
interest must yield. The Supreme Court, in Braunfeld v.
Brown, set out a test for indirect burden cases - legisla-
tion imposing an indirect burden on free exercise is valid
unless government's secular objectives may be accom-
plished without burdening religion. The author of this
Note examines the Supreme Courts decisions in direct
burden cases and in indirect burden cases both before and
after Branfeld to determine the validity of the test. He
concludes that the Braunfeld test satisfactorily accom-
modates the secular objective and the individual right
and gives consistency and predictability to the area.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment guarantee prohibiting governmental in-
terference with the free exercise of religion' is twofold: the free-
dom to believe and the freedom to act. Religious belief can neither
be compelled nor proscribed; but religious action, so that govern-
ment may accomplish valid secular objectives, is necessarily sub-
ject to some restraint2 Where legislation, in advancing valid goals,
abridges the practice of some religious activity, the courts must
determine which interest yields. The United States Supreme Court
has not made these determinations often enough to adduce a
standard, and the disparity of its decisions, even upon similar in-
terests within a short number of years,3 demonstrates the absence
of any standard that might aid the interested citizen or lawyer, as
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .. " US. CoNST. amend. I. The
fourteenth amendment makes both the establishment clause and the free
exercise clause of -the first amendment wholly applicable to the states. Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
2. Id. at 303-04. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
3. A good example of the instability in this area is the case of Alinersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (8 to 1 decision), which was over-
ruled within three years by West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943). Compare Murdock v. "Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), with
Jones v. Opelika, 316 US. 584 (19-2).
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well as the various legislatures, in defining the limits and conse-
quences of their activities and rights.4
In attempting to find a workable standard, the Supreme Court
has, of late, made a valuable distinction between direct and indi-
rect burdens on the free exercise of religion. A direct burden in-
volves an irreconcilable conflict between the individual's religious
tenets and obedience to the law, necessitating "either abandoning
his religious practice or facing criminal prosecution." On the
other hand, an indirect burden is imposed by "legislation which
does not make unlawful the religious practice itself,"7 but which
does place incidentally a hardship, such as economic loss, upon
individuals carrying on a particular religious activity. The value
of the distinction lies in the basic approach of the courts to free
exercise cases, balancing the individual's religious rights and the
burdens imposed by legislation infringing religious activities
against the manner and importance of accomplishing the secular
goal. The direct burden cases should be distinguished from the
indirect burden cases: Where a direct conflict between the indi-
vidual's religious principles and government's secular goals exists,
the courts are faced with abolishing one or the other, an extremely
delicate task of balancing." Where only an indirect burden is im-
posed on the individual and some accommodation is possible by
which neither the individual right nor the legislative goal need be
totally abandoned, the court might be able to apply a more pre-
dictable, definitive rule.
The United States Supreme Court in Braunfeld v. Brown,' a
Sunday closing law case, suggested such a rule specifically for an
indirect burden case:
[I]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious ob-
servance unless the State -may accomplish its purpose by means which
do not impose such a burden.' 0
Appellants in Braunfeld were merchants required under Pennsyl-
vania law" to keep their businesses closed on Sunday and corn-
4. See generally Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29
U. Cni. L. R v. 1 (1961).
5. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
6. Id. at 605.
7. Id. at 606.
8. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 ,(1944).
9. 866 U.S. 599 (1961).
10. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
11. Sunday closing laws are in force in the majority of states. They regu-
late, generally, the conduct of business and other activities on Sunday and
vary in detail to a considerable extent in the various states. See McGowan
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pelled by their religion, the Orthodox Jewish faith, to close their
businesses also on Saturday, their Sabbath. Appellants, alleging
that compulsory Sunday closing impaired their livelihoods by
causing them substantial financial loss, contended that therefore
it was an unconstitutional infringement of their free exercise of
religion." The Supreme Court decided that the state had a valid
purpose in establishing a uniform day of rest and that the legisla-
ture had not exceeded constitutional limits in determining that
alternative means, such as exempting Sabbatarians from the legis-
lation or establishing a different day of rest, would not accomplish
the desired result'3
An obvious alternative to the Braunfeld test for indirect bur-
den cases might be the unqualified14 balancing approach employed
by the Supreme Court in the direct burden cases. The purpose of
this Note is first to examine the unqualified balancing approach
to show that it sacrifices consistency and predictability; then to
examine representative indirect burden decisions both before and
after Braunfeld to ascertain whether the more definitive Braunfeld
test, if applied to areas other than Sunday closing, 5 satisfactorily
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 551--59 (App. I) (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). The particular legislation in question in Braunfeld was PA. STAT. v's..
fit. 18, § 4699.10 (Cum. Supp. 1960), a penal statute proscribing certain Sun-
day retail sales and prescribing fines and imprisonment for violations of such
statute.
12. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two
Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Me-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which were companion cases to
Braunfeld. The McGowan and McGinley cases decided that Sunday closing
laws did not effect an establishment of religion and did not violate due
process. Appellants in those cases were not Sabbatarians and, therefore, had
no standing to raise the free exercise issue. See also Arlan's Dep't Store, Inc.
v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962) (dismissed per curiam for want of a sub-
stantial federal question).
13. See Note, State Sunday Laws and the Religious Guarantees of the
Federal Constitution, 73 E&v. L. Rsv. 729, 740-43 (1960), for a discussion
of why exemption of Sabbatarians from Sunday closing requirements would
not necessarily be an acceptable alternative regulation. Generally, the prob-
lems of effectively policing such a regulation, the possible commercial advan-
tage thus given Sabbatarians, and the destruction of the restful atmosphere
of the day combine to make such alternative legislation less desirable.
14. The traditional balancing approach of the courts is referred to as
"unqualified" in order to distinguish 
-the Braunmfdd test, which is itself a bal-
ancimg approach with the advantage of more definite weights given in ad-
vance to the interests to be 'balanced. See text accompanying note 31 infra.
15. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961). Many of the
same considerations are found in both direct and indirect burden cases and
in cases involving the various basic liberties. Whether or not the Braunfeld
test or some elements or variations thereof ought to be applied outside the
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accommodates the individual right and the secular objective in
all cases of an indirect burden on the free exercise of religion."0
II. DIRECT BURDEN CASES AND THE
BALANCING OF INTERESTS
The Supreme Court has considered direct burdens upon free ex-
ercise in only four areas: public welfare, compulsory military duty,
compulsory jury duty, and compulsory patriotic pledges. The
first significant case in which the Supreme Court upheld public
welfare legislation imposing a direct burden upon the individual's
religious practice was Reynolds v. United States.'7 In Reynolds
a statute proscribing the practice of bigamy was sustained against
the Mormon defendant's claim of infringement of his free exercise
of religion. The Court felt that conduct so repugnant to the moral
standards of the nation and so dangerous to the community con-
cepts of peace and good order justified the abolition of the reli-
gious practice.'8 Similarly, the Supreme Court upheld child labor
legislation in Prince v. Massachusetts."9 The Court decided that
a parent could be punished for allowing a child to sell religious
literature in public places even though for the parent and child,
both Jehovah's Witnesses, such activity was a religious duty; the
state's interest in protecting children was considered to override
the individual's right to the free exercise of religious practice. 0
area of indirect burdens on the free exercise of religion is beyond 'the scope
of this Note.
It should also be noted that some have considered the Braunfeld -test un-
desirable even as applied to the indirect 'burden imposed by the Sunday clos-
ing laws. See Donaldson, Freedom of Religion and the Recent Sunday Closing
Laws Cases, 3 WiLIAm & MARY L. REV. 384 (1962).
16. Technically the Braunfeld test is limited to state legislation. There
appears to be no reason why the standard for federal legislation should not be
the same.
17. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
18. Another case concerning the Mormon practice of polygamy was
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 833 (1890). Davis was convicted of perverting the
laws of Idaho by -taking falsely an oath, required of a voter before exercise
of the franchise, that he did not practice, teach, or belong to any group teach-
ing or encouraging the practice of polygamy. Thus the statute singled out
members of the Morman religion and disqualified -them from voting because
they belonged to that group. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
legislation saying that it presented no issues different from those raised in
Reynolds. The authority of the Davis case is quite questionable at the present
time. See Kurland, supra note 4, at 8-11; ef. Torcaso v. Watkins, 307 U.S.
488 (1961).
19. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
20. In another public welfare legislation case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Supreme Court determined that a state law prescribing
penalties for adults who refused ,to be vaccinated was valid where the legisla-
The courts have long recognized the governmental authority
to compel service in the armed forces. In the Selective Draft Law
Cases' the United States Supreme Court summarily dismissed
the argument that compulsory military service conflicted with
the guarantees of individual liberties found in the Constitution.
The Court felt that the decision that individual rights must yield
to the secular goal of total availability of manpower for the na-
tional defense was unquestionably clear?
The balance in direct burden cases has not, however, always
been found to tip in favor of upholding legislation. Most recently,
in In e Jenisonm the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed itself
on remand from the United States Supreme Court 4 and held that
a woman could not be compelled to serve on jury duty where her
religious principles dictated that she not "judge" her fellow man.2 5
The rationale of the Minnesota court's decision and, evidently, of
the Supreme Court in remanding was that the secular interest in
finding competent jurors would not be materially hindered if re-
ligious objectors were exempted from duty, particularly in light
of the statutory exemptions already granted for certain classes of
ture deemed such vaccination necessary .to secure the community against
smallpox. Jacobson was decided on the ground that no constitutional liberty
was infringed by such regulation. "Constitutional liberty" certainly includes
freedom of -religion, although other defenses -were more strongly urged. State
decisions have more specifically dealt with the religion question in upholding
legislation that compelled parents to secure proper medical care for their
children even .though it was contrary to their religious beliefs to do so. E.g.,
Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y.
201, 68 N._. 243 (1903).
21. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
22. The Court felt that the unsoundness of the claim that the exemption
provisions of the act infringed either the free exercise or the establishment
clause was -too apparent to require more than mere mention. Id. at 390. Re-
ligious objectors have been allowed exemption not by right but only by
legislative grace.
2S. 125 N.W.2d 588 (Ain. 1963).
24. The original Mnesota Supreme Court decision, In re Jenison, 265
Minn. 96, 120 N.W2d 515 (1963), was remanded by the United States Su-
preme Court in light of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In re Jenison,
375 U.S. 14 (1963). The Minnesota Supreme Court then reversed itself, 125
N.W.2d 588 (Mn. 1963).
25. There was generally no dispute as to the validity of the religious claims
made -by Mrs. Jenison and the parties involved in the other situations dis-
cussed.in this Note. The extent of inquiry states or courts can make into the
truth or falsity of the religious 'beliefs espoused is an issue not considered in
this Note. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). For a suggestion
that it is desirable to limit what forms of religious practice are to be protected
under the free exercise clause, see Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion,
36 So. CAL. L. Rzv. 546, 547-48 (1963).
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people 2 ' The state's interest was not sufficient to allow the state
to abridge the individual's religious freedom2 7
In yet another area, in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette,2 s the United States Supreme Court decided that children in
a compulsory education system could not be compelled against
their religious beliefs to participate in patriotic displays, such as
the pledge to the American flag.29 Leaving unquestioned the
premise that national unity and patriotism are valid secular inter-
ests, the Court felt that attempting to force such sentiments would
not accomplish the desired goals. The Court, resting on broader
grounds than freedom of religion,"0 concluded that interference with
the first amendment liberties is more likely to produce dissatisfac-
tion with, rather than adherence to, the American way of life, the
secular goal advanced to support the state legislation, of which
the freedoms of speech and religion form such a basic part.
Even these few direct burden decisions demonstrate the deli-
cacy with which the courts must decide whether the religious
activity or the secular interest is to survive. Perhaps a standard
with even minimal rigidity is undesirable and ineffectual to de-
termine properly the unique direct burden cases that might arise.
Such a standard could not do justice to either secular or sectarian
interest under all circumstances. Yet, in the area of indirect bur-
dens, where an accommodation of interests, rather than an aboli-
tion of interests, is possible, a definitive standard might have some
utility.
26. Many classes of citizens are commonly exempted from jury duty. Such
would seem to demonstrate that there is no necessity to compel every avail-
able citizen to serve in this capacity. E.g., MINr. STAT. §§ 3.081 (legislators
and legislative employees), 192.24 (members of the National Guard), 593.18
(dentists and pharmacists), 628.44 (forestry division employees).
27. It seems doubtful that compelling an individual against his conscien-
tious beliefs to "judge" his fellow man is in the best interests of justice. A
person placed in such a position is likely to return a verdict substantially
colored by the emotional stress under which such compulsion places him. See
77 H v. L. REv. 550, 551 (1964).
28. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
29. Barnette overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940), which -had decided that the individual's free exercise of religion had
to yield to the state interest under such circumstances.
80. The decision in Barnette did not rest on freedom of religion as such,
although that was the major ground urged by the appellants. The Court spoke
of first amendment liberties generally in its decision with some emphasis on
freedom of speech, since compulsory pledges forced individuals to declare,
against their wishes, particular beliefs.
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Ill. APPLICATION OF THE BRA UNFELD TEST TO
OTiER INDIRECT BURDEN CASES
The Braunfeld test is basically a balancing approach, but with
significant advantages over the unqualified balancing of interests
used in the direct burden cases: only the validity of the secular
goal is in question, not its relative significance or weight; and
only the character of the burden imposed on religion - whether
it is direct or indirect -is in question, not the substantiality of
the practical effect of that burden. Any rigidity in this approach
is reduced to an acceptable minimum for indirect burden cases
by the third element of the standard: if the secular goal may be
accomplished by means that do not burden the free exercise of
religion, then legislation that does burden religion is invalid. The
rationale underlying the Braunfeid test is, essentially, that if the
legislation imposing a burden on religion effects no valid state
purpose or if the purpose could be substantially accomplished
without burdening religious exercise, the legislation is suspect of
having as its real purpose interference with religious activity and
is invalid "even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect?' 3 '
The Braunfeld Court in no way implied that it was establish-
ing a novel approach to indirect burden cases, nor was the validity
of prior decisions in this area questioned; rather, the Court seemed
to be simply spelling out the process of reasoning that has and
does render proper decisions in this area. The value of the Braun-
feld test as a standard lending consistency and predictability to
this area might, then, be measured by how well it is resolutive
of prior decisions on indirect interference with the free exercise
of religion.
A. DECISIONS PRIOR TO Braunfeld
In several cases the Supreme Court has considered whether
government may regulate religious activity by imposing licensing
or taxing requirements. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania" the United
States Supreme Court held that a state could not constitutionally
levy a flat tax upon a religious activity;aa that a license tax upon
the distribution of religious literature, even though the literature
31. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
32. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
33. The decision made clear that the invalidation of a tax upon the exer-
cise of a religious practice in no way implies that preachers or churches are
exempt from their rightful financial burdens, such as property and income
taxes.
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was sold rather than donated,8 4 was invalid. In the similar case of
Follett v. Town of McCormick"5 a regulation substantially the
same as that in Murdock - a flat tax was imposed on the right of
"preaching the gospel" just as if the license tax had been exacted
from one preaching from the pulpit in the more traditional man-
ner - was also declared unconstitutional. In contrast to Murdock
and Follett, the Court decided in Cox v. New Hampshire8 that a
state statute, which required a license and a fee to hold a proces-
sion or parade on a public street, invoked against Jehovah's Wit-
nesses engaging in a religious exercise was valid. The Court rea-
soned that reasonable regulation effecting a state purpose was
constitutionally valid even though it interfered with religious
activity, so long as the regulation did not involve the potential
abolition of the religious practice.
Each of the regulatory statutes in Murdock, Follett and Cox
apparently effected the same secular objectives - preventing dis-
orderly conduct, maintaining reasonable limits upon the number
of participants and time of activities, and protecting the public
from perpetration of fraudulent schemes.37 The regulation in Cox
was not a flat fee tax as in Murdock or Follett, but only an ad-
justed fee to meet administrative costs of policing public demon-
strations. The unconstitutional element in the regulations im-
posed in Murdock and Follett was the potential burden of a highly
oppressive tax that could effectively prohibit religious exercise,""
the majority in Murdock stated that if the tax were nominal or
apportioned to defray the costs of regulating the activity, it might
be valid.89 The distinction in this area between valid and invalid
34. Murdock reversed Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), which had
held that taxation of the sale of religious literature was valid because of the
commercial overtones of such activity and because a fiscal exemption in such
an instance would be a form of subsidy to religion which the first amendment
does not require. See note 54 infra.
35. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
36. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
37. Since regulation was considered the secular goal behind these ordi-
nances and statutes, the Court did not determine whether such regulations
would have been valid as revenue producing measures. Under the Braunfeld
standard, they would not be valid, for the secular goal of producing revenue
could -be accomplished by means that do not burden religious activity.
38. The power to levy a flat tax upon an activity is -the power to sup-
press such activity. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 WHEAT) 316, 427
(1819).
39. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Largent v. Texas,
318 U.S. 418 (1943), raise issues similar to those in -the Murdock and Follett
cases. The former cases were complicated by, and decided upon, the fact that
the ordinances there challenged had left authority in local officials, at their
regulation apparently depends on whether the regulation author-
izes, potentially, the-effective elimination of the religious activity.
Thus, a statute or ordinance imposing a nondiscriminatory ad-
justed fee to attain valid secular goals will stand notwithstanding
some burden on the individual's religious freedom; while on the
other hand, one imposing flat tax rates that could interfere with
religious activities to an unnecessary degree, if not to the extent of
effective abolition, will be invalid.41
The application of the B'aunfed standard to Murdock, Follue,
and (ox yields the same result in the licensing and taxation area,
with the advantage of a more consistent and more logical ap-
proach. Without questioning the validity of the secular goals of
public order and of the elimination of possible nuisances and
frauds, the Braunfeld test would allow regulation by licensing
and taxation so long as no other means is available to accomplish
these goals - only regulation that is necessary to achieve the
state's goals may interfere with religious practice. Therefore, a
flat tax, as in Murdock and Folet, which theoretically could be-
come prohibitive, placing an unnecessary element of interference
beyond the advancement of the valid secular goal of regulation,
discretion, to deny licenses to religious groups. The Court decided that such
potential for arbitrary discrimination made the regulations invalid. Clearly
such unnecessary capacity for suppression of religious exercise would be in-
valid under the Braunfeld standard.
40. An interesting and unique issue was raised in Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946). In a company-owned town, Jehovah's Witnesses were pun-
ished for distributing -their literature on the -basis of a statute making it a
crime for anyone to remain on private property after having been warned
not to do so. The Court felt there was -no significant constitutional difference
between essentially public facilities (streets and sidewalks) owned by a mu-
nicipality or by a engle corporation. The public -in either case has a right to
have the channels of communication kept -free. The managers of such a
company-owned town cannot curtail the religious freedom of persons living
in or passing through the town. A state statute so applied to obstruct the
freedoms of press and religion is clearly unconstitutional.
41. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Murdock, referring to a state-
ment by Mr. Justice Holmes in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S.
218, 22-3 (1928), made the point that the power -to tax is not the power to
destroy as long as courts sit. 319 U.S. at 137. It should be considered whether
the tax -in question does in fact indirectly suppress what the legislatures can-
not directly suppress. The Murdock majority view that any flat tax is invalid,
with the implication that a properly apportioned fee would be valid, leaves
room for decisions to turn on the particular wording of particular statutes.
If Mr. Frankfurter's point was to say -that the realistic purpose and effect of
the regulation should be determinative of cases rather than matters of form
of a particular statute, perhaps his view should be followed. But in either
view, the prohibitive or potentially prohibitive element of the regulation was
what the Court found invalid.
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would be held invalid because a nominal tax or adjusted fee, as
in Cox, to insure registration and identification, costs not right-
fully borne by the public at large, could achieve the valid secular
purpose without unnecessary interference.
Indirect interference with religious practices, as well as direct,
4 2
has resulted from the exercise of the congressional power to compel
military service. In Hamilton v. Regents of California3 the Su-
preme Court affirmed the denial of a writ of mandamus to Ham-
ilton who sought readmission to the University of California after
having been suspended for refusing, on religious grounds, to par-
ticipate in the University's compulsory military training program.
Once it was established that the state had the power, by con-
gressional act,44 to conduct such a program, the Court decided
that exemptions need not be made and, when made, were by legis-
lative grace.45 The program imposed only an indirect burden on
the individual's free exercise of religion, for by suffering the incon-
venience and added expense of attending a school with no com-
pulsory military training, he could practice his religious convic-
tions. Arguably, if government could impose the direct burden
of compulsory military service, upheld in the Selective Draft Law
Cases,46 then the lesser infringement of religion imposed by the
indirect burden of a compulsory military training program, as in
Hamilton, would also be permissible. But this does not necessarily
follow, at least not under the Braunfeld test. The direct burden
of the Selective Draft Law Cases may have been necessary to
secure the secular goal of adequate military preparedness, avoid-
ing difficult determinations of the validity of religious claims; but
that secular goal can not support the Hamilton program, for ade-
quate military preparedness could be fully accomplished through
the compulsory draft without imposing the indirect burden of
compulsory military training as a requisite to an education.
42. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 866 (1918), discussed in text
accompanying notes 20 & 21 smpra.
43. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
44. The University of California is a land grant school. Under the terms
of the Morrill Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 503, 7 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (1958) such schools
are required to offer military training. Therefore, the Regents, acting under
the state legislature and being authorized under the Morrill Act, have been
given power from Congress to carry on -such training and to determine which
types and amounts of such training shall be required of each student enrolled
in the University.
45. The Court relied on Coale v. Pearson, 290 U.S. 597 (1938); United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.
366 (1918); Jacobson v. United States, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
46. 245 U.S. 366 (1918); see text accompanying notes 20 & 21 spra.
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Therefore, the Hamilton program would be unnecessary and in-
valid under the Braunfeld standard.
The secular purpose underlying the Hamilton program, how-
ever, could not have been to require military training for all male
American university students - Congress did not require the
program at all universities nor did Congress require that univer-
sities implementing the program make it compulsory. Actually,
the goal of the legislation was merely to assure that land grant
colleges would offer military training as an area of study in the
same manner as a program in mechanical arts or agriculture. 7
Clearly, to make military training compulsory to accomplish this
congressional goal is no more necessary than to require an indi-
vidual to study both of the other disciplines. Thus, as the secular
objective could be attained without imposing an indirect burden
on the individual student's religious principles, state action mak-
ing the program compulsory, as evaluated by the Braunfeld stand-
ard, would be unnecessary and invalid 8
If the Supreme Court were to apply the Braunfeld test in all
indirect burden cases, it would also have to reconsider its decision
47. 36 Ops. A'r'Y GEN. 297, 299-300 (1930). See also CONG. GwODE, 37th
Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (App.) (1863) (remarks of Senator Morrill).
48. For a similar suggestion that the burden imposed on Hamilton was
unnecessary, see Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HLAv. L. Jlnv. 1595,
1600 (1955).
Such a resolution of the case makes it unnecessary to consider whether
Hamilton might have claimed that if Congress were to allow religious exemp-
tions from military duty, it was a violation of -his right to the free exercise of
religion arbitrarily to deny .him a religious exemption in this situation.
Professor Kurland has proposed as a standard in the area of freedom of
religion that
The freedom [of religion] and separation [of church and state] clauses
should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot
utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses,
read -together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of reli-
gion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.
Kurland, supra note 4, at 96. This very logical theory -would not allow religious
exemptions in areas such as military duty or jury duty. If freedom of religion
means that no unnecessary interference with religion is justified, such a theory
must fail. The fact that Congress has provided in some measure exemptions
for conscientious objectors seems to reveal the attitude of the public that the
ideal of free exercise of religion is best accomplished when some accommoda-
tion for religious -beliefs is made whenever possible. As to the validity of ex-
emption provisions, see Conklin, Concientious Objector Provisions: A View
in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. LJ. 252 (1963).
There is a somewhat distinct problem as to how far the government must
go in allowing religious exemptions once it has decided to make them. See
United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), 48 Mm;N. L. Rnv. 771.
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in In re Summers.49 Petitioner Summers was refused admittance
to the practice of law in Illinois on the ground that he had refused
to take the required oath to support the Illinois' constitution; his
"conscientious scruples" against participation in war made it im-
possible for him to support that part of the constitution requiring
him to serve in the state militia in time of war. The Court, recog-
nizing the state's power to compel military service, decided the
oath could be required of an officer of the court, even though it
infringed his religious beliefs.50 Under the Braunfeld test this deci-
sion could not stand. The valid secular goal allowing the imposi-
tion of compulsory military service could be secured without re-
quiring the oath: If Summers were needed in the state militia, he
could be compelled to serve. Indeed, requiring an oath including the
willingness to serve as a criterion of admission to the bar bears no
relationship to the accomplishment of the state's goal.,' Mr. Jus-
tice Black, dissenting in Summers, went further and suggested
that there had been no implication prior to this case that consci-
entious objection to war bears any relation to the character of
the individual such as would make him unacceptable to partici-
pate in the judicial process.2 Therefore, because no valid secular
goal is advanced by requiring the oath, the infringement of re-
ligious practice would invalidate the requirement under the
Braunfeld test.
B. ACTION OF THE COURT AFTER Braunfeld
Since Braunfeld, the Supreme Court decided Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,53 a case somewhat similar to Braunfeld in the indirect burden
imposed on the free exercise of religion. The appellant in Sherbert,
49. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
50. If it were claimed -that the purpose of such an oath was to instill
patriotism in the members of the Illinois bar, the discussion in the flag salute
cases, discussed in text accompanying notes 27-29 supra, on whether such
compelled rituals accomplish the desired goal would he pertinent.
51. It has been suggested elsewhere that the oath in Summers lacked suffi-
cient relevancy -to the -state's purpose. See Note, 73 HAnv. L. Rzv. 1595, 1597
(1955). Compare United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). In -these cases individuals who
qualified their willingness to bear arms in defense of the United States if
required to do so were denied admittance to citizenship. The requirements of
the oath of allegiance in these cases differ from that in Summers. Since citi-
zens who are conscientious objectors are subject -to the duty to bear arms if
required of them and exempted only by legislative grace, it does not appear
that applicants for such status should be allowed to say they might not serve
if called, but they must, rather, say that they will serve if Congress does not
see fit to allow them exemption. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61
(1946).
52. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 57S-78 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
58. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
who had been discharged by her employer because, as a Seventh-
Day Adventist, she refused to work on Saturday, was denied
unemployment compensation because the South Carolina statute
denied benefits to one who had failed, without good cause, to ac-
cept available, suitable work. The Court did not explicitly follow
Braunfeld, but, rather, it returned to the general language of a
balancing of interests often used in direct burden cases: The Court
first decided that the burden imposed on the appellant was only
indirect, then it sought a "compelling state interest" to justify
the burden. Finding none, the Court declared that the statute un-
constitutionally abridged the appellant's free exercise of religion."
Although three Justices thought this decision was inconsistent
with Braunfeld,5 5 an explicit application of the Braunfeld test to
Sherbert would appear to yield the same result. The validity of
the public welfare objective of unemployment compensation is
unquestioned. Whatever qualification the state might place on
the receipt of benefits to prevent fraudulent claims would also
be valid, since without the prevention of any significant number
of false claims, the state might be unable to afford such a relief
program. But the deciding element under the Braunfekd test, and
what must have been the real basis of the Court's reasoning in
Sherbert, is that it was unnecessary to deny flatly benefits because
an individual refused to forsake a religious tenet in order to qualify
for them.
The state's goals of providing subsistence to the state's unem-
ployed would not be advanced by denying relief to the appellant
unless allowing religious claims would so burden the state's pro-
gram as to necessitate abandonment of all unemployment relief.
The state made no showing that such a burden existed. Further,
any slight burden of establishing the validity of religious claims
would be offset by the more successful satisfaction of the state's
goal of providing relief in all appropriate cases of hardship. Sher-
bert is most clearly distinguished from Braunfeld on that very
basis. In Braunfeld a significant part of the secular goal was to
54. A complicating factor underlying any decision in cases such as Sherbert
is that exemptions made on religious grounds sometimes give financial assist-
ance to individuals so exempted when the sane fnancial aid would be denied
another in the same position without such exempting beliefs. The dilemma
thus created, as yet unresolved, is that in safeguarding the free exercise of
religion if, in effect, a subsidy is thus granted individuals of a particular re-
ligious belief, the courts are assisting or effecting the establishment of those
religious beliefs as against other religions or nonreligion. See Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398,418-18 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
55. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); id. at 418,(Harlan, J., & White, J., dissenting).
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provide a uniform day of rest, 6 which could be accomplished only
by allowing no exceptions; on the other hand, in Sherbert the goal
of relieving the onus of unemployment is more successful when
the benefits are not denied.57
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court did not specifically employ the
Braunfeld test in Sherbert, whether the Court intends to use the
test in the future is unclear. If the Braunfeld test does explain the
current reasoning, implicit or explicit, of the Court's indirect bur-
den decisions, a consistent application of the standard would lend
56. The Braunfeld decision, 366 U.S. at 602-03, relied on McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), in determining that the legislature's choice
of Sunday as a uniform day of rest was not an "establishment" of those re-
ligions which recognize that day as -the Sabbath. Although Sunday as a day
of -Test originally had religious connotations, it is now recognized traditionally
as a secular -holiday. The fact that regulation merely coincides with the tenets
of some religions does not invalidate such regulation. Id. at 431-44.
57. Two other types of cases involving issues similar to those in the cases
discussed in the text are the cases involving fluoridation of water supplies,
e.g., De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1012 (1954); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d
609 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1955), and cases involving union
shop agreements, e.g., Wicks v. Southern Pacific Co., 231 F.2d 130 (1956). In
neither type of cases has the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision
on the merits.
In the fluoridation cases, those individuals whose religious -beliefs will not
allow the use of any drugs or medical treatments could claim that their free
exercise of religion is indirectly burdened by forcing them to undergo the ex-
pense and inconvenience of seeking a pure water supply. Applying the Braun-
fed standard, a court would have to determine whether the secular purpose
of aiding the prevention of tooth decay is valid and whether the fluoridation of
the whole water supply at its source is a necessary means of accomplishing
such a goal. The court would seemingly 'have to measure the relative cost and
efficiency of alternative methods of fluoridation, such as lopical fluoridation,
fluoridation tablets, fluoridized salt, etc., to determine whether such alterna-
fives can substantially accomplish the secular goal without 'burdening religion.
See generally Nichols, Freedom of Religion and the Water Supply, 32 So. CAl,.
L. REv. 158 (1959).
The second type of case involves individuals whose religious beliefs would
not allow them to join labor unions. When their employers joined the unions
in union -shop agreements, such individuals lost their jobs. Likewise their
religion would not allow these individuals to pay into the union an amount
equal to union dues even if they were not compelled to join the union. This
case is 'beyond the scope of this Note and the Braunfeld standard, for a private
agreement has here imposed an indirect burden upon the free exercise of reli-
gion. No governmental regulation or legislation imposed such a burden. Plain-
tiffs' claim would have to be that government must prevent union shop agree-
ments 'when they burden religious freedom rather than that the government
consistency and predictability to this field.58 The Braunfeld test
is by no means an absolute, invariable formula. The courts must
still make value judgments in determining whether a given secular
goal might be attained without imposing an indirect burden on
religious practices. Also, the courts must decide whether the alter-
nate means of attaining the goal must be equally as effective, al-
most as effective, or merely sufficient when compared with the
legislation imposing the burden. Notwithstanding these subjective
elements of the test, the Braunfeld standard is substantially more
definitive than the unqualified balancing approach taken in the
direct burden cases, and it seems quite capable of serving as a
much-needed basic approach and consistent focus with which the
courts, legislatures, and individuals may begin any inquiry in
the area of indirect burdens upon the free exercise of religion.59
has caused such a burden. This situation seemingly raises somewhat unique
issues.
In neither of -the above situations have the individuals' religious claims
been upheld by the courts.
58. The United States Supreme Court -remanded In re Jenison, 265 Arm.
96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963), in light of Sherbert. In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14
(1963). Jenisom is clearly a direct burden case while Sherbert is clearly an in-
direct burden case. Such action further confuses predictions as to whether the
Court is going -to distinguish between direct and indirect burden cases or apply
different standards in the two areas. Again the need for consistent treatment
in free exercise of religion cases is further demonstrated.
59. See generally Van Aistyne, Constitutional Separation of Church and
State: The Quest for a Coherent Position, 57 Amr. PoL. Scr. Rnv. 865 (1963),
for a discussion of many of the problems in this area, and a suggestion for a
wider application of a standard with many elements similar to the Braunfeld
test.
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